Aristotle's conception and use of ta endoxa are key points to our understanding of Aristotelian dialectic. But, nowadays, they are not of historical or hermeneutic importance alone, as, in Aristotle's treatment of endoxa, we still see a relevant contribution to the modern study of argumentation. I propose here an interpretation of endoxa to that effect: namely, as plausible propositions. This version is not only defensible in the Aristotelian context, it may also shed new light on some of his assumptions and (...) methodological shortcomings – e.g. concerning the 'plausible/implausible' pair –; finally, it will even enable us to show certain basic hints and guidelines, advanced by Aristotle's study of endoxa, which still serve nowadays to orientate our studies of argumentation from the angle of a theory of plausible argument currently under construction. These hints and guidelines suggest a pragmatic, gradual and comparative discursive concept of plausibility, and point, in particular, towards the reasonable dealing with, and weighing up of, differences of opinion within this frame of reference. (shrink)

I propose to read Rhetoric as a presentation of the art of public discourse. I believe that in this sense its conception rests on three capital ideas, namely rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; its function is not to persuade but to contemplate the available means of persuasion in each case; rhetoric is like some offshoot of dialectic and of ethical study which is rightly called politics. and vindicate the condition and quality of rhetoric as a fully entitled art of (...) speech; places it in the realm of deliberative public discourse. Finally, a few notes about the topicality of some Aristotelian ideas in the debate on democracy and collective deliberation will lead to the conclusion that Aristotle, without being one of us, is one of ours. (shrink)

Hoy estamos asistiendo a un creciente interés por la retórica argumentativa debido a su estrecha relación con el discurso público. Tienen especial relieve dos puntos a este respecto: 1, la contribución de la retórica a la revisión crítica de los programas en curso de la llamada “democracia deliberativa”; 2, la lectura de la Retórica de Aristóteles en la línea de estos propósitos críticos. Mi artículo se propone desarrollar este segundo punto a través de un examen de la concepción aristotélica de (...) la retórica y de su vindicación de la deliberación pública. (shrink)

The decisive role played by Ortega and his “School of Madrid” in modernizing the 20th century Spanish thinking is widely accepted, but their contribution to bring our logic up to day was rather unfortunate: far from backing the introduction or reception of modern logic, the “School of Madrid” attempted an alternative logic, the so-called ‘logic of vital reason’, non-viable. As it is a symptomatic failure, I’ll give a broader account of it starting from, and going through, a confrontation in this (...) respect between the “School of Madrid” and its contemporary “School of Barcelona”. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Giving Reasons pretende ofrecer una aproximación no solo precisa, sino comprensiva, a una teoría sistemática de la argumentación. A la luz de una distinción de Vaz Ferreira entre «pensar por sistemas» y «pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta», me gustaría hacer unas observaciones para complementar y, digamos, “abrir” la incipiente clausura teórica del sistema lingüístico-pragmático de Giving Reasons. Voy a considerar dos casos en particular: el tratamiento del concepto mismo de argumentación y la conversión del principio de cooperación (...) y las máximas de Grice en una especie de marco sistemático donde cabe encajar y acomodar el estudio de las falacias.ABSTRACT: Giving Reasons aims to provide an approach not only accurate, but comprehensive, to a systematic theory of argumentation. In the light of a distinction made by Vaz Ferreira between «thinking through systems» and «thinking through ideas to be taken into account», I would like to make some comments in order to provide a certain balance and somehow “open” the inchoative theoretical closure of the linguistic-pragmatic system offered in Giving Reasons. I am going to consider two cases in particular: the treatment of the very concept of argumentation and the transformation of Grice’s Cooperative principle and Maxims into a sort of systematic framework to be applied to the study of fallacies. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Giving Reasons pretende ofrecer una aproximación no solo precisa, sino comprensiva, a una teoría sistemática de la argumentación. A la luz de una distinción de Vaz Ferreira entre «pensar por sistemas» y «pensar por ideas a tener en cuenta», me gustaría hacer unas observaciones para complementar y, digamos, “abrir” la incipiente clausura teórica del sistema lingüístico-pragmático de Giving Reasons. Voy a considerar dos casos en particular: el tratamiento del concepto mismo de argumentación y la conversión del principio de cooperación (...) y las máximas de Grice en una especie de marco sistemático donde cabe encajar y acomodar el estudio de las falacias.ABSTRACT: Giving Reasons aims to provide an approach not only accurate, but comprehensive, to a systematic theory of argumentation. In the light of a distinction made by Vaz Ferreira between «thinking through systems» and «thinking through ideas to be taken into account», I would like to make some comments in order to provide a certain balance and somehow “open” the inchoative theoretical closure of the linguistic-pragmatic system offered in Giving Reasons. I am going to consider two cases in particular: the treatment of the very concept of argumentation and the transformation of Grice’s Cooperative principle and Maxims into a sort of systematic framework to be applied to the study of fallacies. (shrink)